CONGRESS ERRS IN DEREGULATING BROADCAST
OWNERSHIP CAPS: MORE MONOPOLIES, LESS LOCALISM,
DECREASED DIVERSITY AND VIOLATIONS OF EQUAL
PROTECTION
Jill Howard

As early as 1815, legislative critics realized that
even Congress, "clothed with every power that
ought to be desired, with abundant means for a
wise and provident government," could "fall into
the mistakes of short sighted man."' Nonetheless,
over one hundred years later, Senator Pepper reminded the world that the "English speaking people have found it wise to place their trust in the
Legislature, subject only to constitutional restraints." 2 Merging the critic's warning with Senator Pepper's declaration, Congress errs when it
produces short-sighted legislation or contravenes
the Constitution. Unfortunately, Congress fell
into both pitfalls in relaxing the limitations on
broadcast ownership via the Telecommunication
Act of 1996 (the 1996 Act). 3
Restraints on the number of broadcast stations
one party may own, both at the national and local
level, have been enforced by the Federal Communications Commission ("FCC" or "Commission")
for decades.4 These restrictions exist to serve two

objectives: (1) furthering the First Amendment
ideal of promoting the public welfare by providing diverse and antagonistic viewpoints; 5 and, (2)
promoting competition in order to ensure efficient use of resources. 6
Despite the paramount importance of the
above objectives, Congress significantly loosened
the limitations on broadcast ownership 7 in the
1996 Act.8 In so doing, the collective Legislature
has personified the "short-sighted man." The results of this Congressional myopia are threefold.
First, the proffered purpose of the 1996 Act, to
increase competition,9 is not mirrored in the effects of relaxed ownership restrictions. Specifically, the result of the intended pro-competitive
legislation is an increase in monopolies and a centralization of control.' 0 As a result, Congress is
legislating in the private interest and deviating
from its own mandate to the FCC to regulate in
the public interest." This centralized ownership
of broadcasting facilities leads to two further det-

U.S. v. Bryan and Woodcock, 13 U.S. 374, 378 (1815).
Myers v. U.S., 272 U.S. 52, 79 (1926).
3
Telecommunication Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104,
§ 202, 110 Stat. 56 (codified at 47 U.S.C.A. § 151 (West Supp.
1996)).
4 In re Review of the Commission's Regs. Governing Television Brdcst., Further Notice of Proposed Rule Making, 10 FCC
Rcd. 3524, para. 2 (1995) [hereinafter 1995 FNPRM].

from broadcast licensees and then program the leased time
and sell advertising to support the program. In re Review of
the Commission's Regs. Governing Television Brdcst., Second
FurtherNotice of ProposedRule Making, MM Docket No. 91-221,
FCC 96-438, para. 80 (Nov. 7, 1996) [hereinafter 1996 Second
FNPRM]. Presently, the Commission does not attribute television LMAs in calculating ownership caps. Id. Radio LMAs,
however, are attributable if the two parties to the LMA are
radio stations in the same market and the broker programs
more than 15% of the station's weekly time. Id. The FCC is
currently seeking comment on whether television LMAs
should be attributable, and if so, whether existing LMAs be
grandfathered from the new attribution rules. Id. para. 92.
8 The 1996 Act, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (codified at 47 U.S.C.A. § 151 (West Supp. 1996)).
9 Id. (The purpose statement reads "An Act to promote
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Id. para. 57.

Id. para. 15.
For purposes of this paper, "ownership" as defined as
"directly or indirectly owning, operating, or controlling" so as
to qualify as an attributable interest as defined in 47 C.F.R.
§ 73.3555 note 2 (1996) (setting forth the criteria for when
an interest in a broadcast license counts in calculating the
number of stations owned by one entity). A related issue,
which is beyond the scope of this article, is whether the Federal Communication Commission (FCC or Commission)
should attribute interests in local marketing agreements
(LMAs), contracts under which brokers lease blocks of time
6
7

competition . . .").

See infra notes 111-126 and accompanying text.
11 In the Communications Act of 1934, Congress created
the FCC "to execute and enforce the provisions of [The 1934
10
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rimental effects: less localism' 2 and decreased diversity.13
In addition to suffocating broadcasting ideals,
the 1996 Act violates the Equal Protection Clause
of the Constitutionl 4 by imposing disparate ownership limitations upon radio and television.' 5
Although radio and television are similarly situated, Congress is preferring radio's purely aural
messages over television's audio-visual communications by allowing the former messages greater
audience penetration nationwide.' 6
Part I of this note traces the history of the five
ownership restrictions most purely affecting
broadcasting - national ownership caps on radio,
national ownership caps on television, local ownership caps on radio, local ownership caps on television, and the one-to-a-market rule banning intra-market ownership of a television and radio
station.1 7 Part II explains the changes in each of
these five areas as a result of the 1996 Act. The
aforementioned Congressional errors of short
sighted legislation and equal protection violations
are discussed in Parts III and IV, respectively.
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trol efforts in 1940 by prohibiting "the issuance of
a license to anyone already possessing a license in
the same broadcast service unless the applicant
could demonstrate that the issuance of the license
(1) would have a pro-competitive impact, and (2)
would not result in the concentration of control
of broadcasting facilities in a manner inconsistent
with the public interest.""' The Commission,
however, immediately abandoned this pliable
standard and journeyed into the turbulent world
of absolute limits, as described below.
A.

National Ownership Limits on Radio

The FCC launched its broadcast ownership con-

The first quantifiable limit, announced in 1940,
placed on the national common ownership of FM
radio outlets was six stations.19 Perhaps sensitized
by the Supreme Court's 1945 determination that
the First Amendment to the Constitution "rests on
the assumption that the widest possible dissemination of information from diverse and antagonistic
sources is essential to the welfare of the public," 20
the Commission established a de facto limit of
seven on the national ownership of AM radio stations in 1946.21 Specifically, the FCC denied CBS'
application for an eighth station stating "it's
against the public interest to permit a concentration of control of broadcasting facilities in any sin-

Act]." 47 U.S.C. § 151 (1994). In enumerating the powers of
the Commission, Congress required the FCC's regulations to
be in the -public convenience, interest, or necessity." 47
U.S.C. § 303 (1994).
12 See infra notes 127-138 and accompanying text.
13 See infra notes 139-152 and accompanying text.
14
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment to the United States Constitution forbids any
state from denying "to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws." U.S. Const. amend. XIV.
Although the Fifth Amendment, which applies to the Federal
Government as opposed to the states, does not expressly contain an equal protection clause, the Supreme Court has held
that the Federal Government is subject to the same equal
protection requirements of the states. "It would be unthinkable that the same Constitution would impose a lesser duty
on the Federal Government." Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S.
497, 500 (1953). "(T)he due process clause of the Fifth
Amendment contains an equal protection component
prohibiting the United States from invidiously discriminating
between individuals or groups." Washington v. Davis, 426
U.S. 229, 236 (1976). Equal protection analysis is the same
under the Fifth Amendment as under the Fourteenth
Amendment. Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 638
n.2 (1975).
15
See infra notes 156-165 and accompanying text.
16 Id. Although the FCC's ownership restrictions have
also treated radio and television owners differently, and consequently violated the Constitution's equal protection clause

by preferring one medium over the other, this article focuses
only on the Legislature's recent actions and the current state
of the law for purposes of the equal protection analysis.
17 47 C.F.R. § 73.3555 (1995) (amended by the 1996 Act,
Pub. L. No. 104-104, § 202, 110 Stat. 56 (codified at 47
U.S.C.A. § 151 (West Supp. 1996))). Other ownership restrictions involving broadcasting, as it relates to other mediums, are: (1) the daily newspaper cross-ownership rule (47
C.F.R § 73.3555(d) (1996)); (2) the rules governing affiliation of a television broadcast station and entities maintaining
networks of television broadcast stations (47 C.F.R.
§ 7 3 .6 58(g) (1996)); and (3) the restrictions on cross ownership or control of cable systems and broadcast networks (47
C.F.R. § 76.501 (1996)). This note is only concerned with
the five ownership restrictions solely involving broadcasting.
The 1996 Act, however, also lessens restrictions on the aforementioned regulations. Pub. L. No. 104-104, § 202, 110 Stat.
56 (codified at 47 U.S.C.A. § 151 (West Supp. 1996)).
18 1995 FNPRM, supra note 4, para. 2.
19 5 Fed. Reg. 2382, 2384 (1940).
20 Associated Press v. U.S., 326 U.S. 1 (1945).
21
In re Sherwood B. Brunton, Decision, 11 F.C.C. 407,
413 (1946). The FCC did not impose an absolute limit on
AM station ownership as it held that, with respect to AM, concentration of control "is not a factor of the absolute number
of stations alone but depends also upon the character of the
facilities involved, e.g., the powers and the frequencies of the
stations." Id.

I. BROADCAST OWNERSHIP LIMITATIONS
BEFORE THE 1996 ACT
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gle person or organization." 22
Seven years later, the FCC expanded its rationale, citing two reasons for placing restrictions on
broadcast ownership. First, diversity of ownership
would provide diverse sources of information.2 3
Second, the Commission sought to safeguard
against undue concentration of economic
power. 2 4 The FCC determined the above objectives would be realized by limiting a single entity's
ownership to seven AM and seven FM stations. 25
Although this "Rule of Seven" remained the status quo for over three decades, the FCC did not
remain dormant in its consideration of ownership
caps.26 In 1984, when the FCC did act, its proposal took a turn toward total deregulation. Convinced that the goals of diversity and competition
were no longer being realized through ownership
caps, 27 the Commission ordered a complete repeal of its national ownership ceilings, to be effective in 1990.28
In response to its extremist action, the FCC received eight petitions from industry requesting it
Id.
In re Amendment of Sections 3.35, 3.240 and 3.636 of
the Rules and Regs. relating to Multiple Ownership of AM,
FM and Television Brdcst. Stations, Report and Order, 9 Rad.
Reg. (P & F) 1563, para. 10 (1953).
24
Id.
25
Id. para. 17.
26 In re Amendment of Section 73.35555 (formerly Sections 73.35, 73.240, and 73.636) of the Commission's Rules
Relating to Multiple Ownership of AM, FM, and Television
Brdcst. Stations, Report and Order, 100 F.C.C.2d 17, para. 18
(1984) [hereinafter 1984 Report and Order]. "Since 1954 the
Commission has several times revisited the Seven Station
Rule, but only to question whether an absolute numerical
limit, rather than geographic or nature of service limits, was
the most appropriate form of regulation." Id.
27
Id. para. 108. The Commission believed:
22
23

the record . .. convincingly establishe[d] that the appro-

priate market for ideas is primarily local, and includes a
broad variety of means of communications, especially
cablecasting, newspapers, and opinion magazines, in addition to radio and television; that, to the extent the idea
market is a national one, it is sufficiently diverse so as to
be unaffected by a change in the Seven Station Rule;
and that network and group owners contribute to viewpoint diversity through the quality and quantity of their
public-affairs programming. Further, the record establishe [d] that there is no danger of excessive economic
concentration in the relevant competitive markets, and
that there are potential efficiency gains from repeal of
the rule.
Id.
28
Id. paras. 109-110. Recognizing the need for "prudence and caution" in the rapidly changing broadcast industry, the Commission instituted a six year transitional period
during which common ownership for each broadcast service
would be capped at 12. At the end of the fixed six year pe-
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reconsider its decision. 29 Upon review of industry's comments, the FCC affirmed its earlier conclusion that repeal of the "Rule of Seven" was in
the public interest; however, it decided that the
proposed complete abandonment of the ownership caps was not integral to the effectuation of its
goals.30 As a result, a single entity was henceforth
permitted to own up to twelve AM and twelve FM
stations nationally.31 In justifying its move from
seven to twelve, the FCC held that while diversity
remained an important consideration, it was not
to function to the exclusion of other considerations, such as the benefits of group ownership. 32
In 1991, the FCC accepted its own invitation
and considered the increase in competition provided by a multitude of non-radio sources as a reason to consider allowing an individual to own a
greater assemblage of stations in order to benefit
from economies of scale. 33 This philosophy remained far more constant than the FCC's implementation, as evidenced by the happenings over
the next three years.34 The ultimate restilt of this
riod, the national ownership caps would be automatically
abandoned in full. Id.
29 In re Amendment of Section 73.3555 (formerly Sections 73.35, 73.240 and 73.636) of the Commission's Rules
Relating to Multiple Ownership of AM, FM, and Television
Brdcst. Stations, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 100
F.C.C.2d 74, para. 1 (1985) [hereinafter 1985 Memorandum
Opinion and Order].
so Id. paras. 30 and 49.
31 Id. para. 53. The national ownership limit was increased to 14 for those acquiring cognizable interests in minority owned and controlled broadcast stations. Id.
32 Id. paras. 35 and 51. The Commission "reject[ed] the
notion that [it] must consider diversity to the exclusion of
other important considerations in assessing the need to retain a national multiple ownership rule. Rather, in determining the approach which best serves the public interest, [the
FCC's] responsibility is to balance considerations of diversity
with other important regulatory goals." Id. para. 51. See infra
note 33 discussing the benefits of increased group ownership.
33 In Re Revision of Radio Rules and Policies, Notice of
Proposed Rule Making, 6 FCC Rcd. 3275, para. 3 (1991) [hereinafter 1991 NPRM]. The FCC found it necessary to "balance
diversity with the need to foster economic growth in order to
provide vigorous competition," however, stressed it was still
concerned with promoting diversity. Id. para. 10. The economies of scale theory is that group ownership will foster the
consolidation of "management, bookkeeping, secretarial,
sales and programming personnel for a number of stations
and . . . [low] group advertising sales and group program
development and purchases . . . . Such benefits ultimately

rebound to the public by increasing the responsiveness, quality and diversity of programming." Id. para. 4.
34 The Commission's initial action was to increase the national ownership limit to 30 AM and 30 FM stations. In Re
Revision of Radio Rules and Policies, Report and Order, 7 FCC
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1991 rulemaking proceeding was the increase in
national radio ownership caps to twenty AM and
twenty FM stations.35 These restrictions36 were in
effect when President Clinton signed The Telecommunication Act of 1996 on February 8, 1996.
B.

National Ownership Limits on Television

In the early days of its regulations, the Commission imposed stricter national limits on television
station ownership than on radio ownership. In
1941, the FCC limited a person or entity from
owning more than three stations nationwide.37
The Commission's stringent standards relaxed in
1944, when it raised the limit to five stations.38
Beginning in 1953, however, the Commission's
concerns for diversity and competition were manifested in a more consistent fashion between radio
Rcd. 2755, para. 23 (1992) [hereinafter 1992 Report and Order]. In response to several petitions for reconsideration, and
"in an abundance of caution," however, the Commission reduced the 30 stations-per-service limit just months after its
adoption. In Re Revision of Radio Rules and Policies, Memorandum Opinion and Order and Further Notice of Proposed Rule

Making, 7 FCC Rcd. 6387, paras. 10 and 70 (1992) [hereinafter 1992 FNPRM]. The new national ownership limits were
18 stations per service, ultimately increasing to 20 AM and 20
FM two years after the effective date of the rule (i.e. September 16, 1994). Id. para. 70. Additionally, all owners were permitted to obtain a non-controlling interest in three additional AM and FM stations if such stations were minority or
small business controlled. Id.
35
In Re Revision of Radio Rules, Second Memorandum
Opinion and Order,9 FCC Rcd. 7183, para. 5 (1994) [hereinafter 1994 Second Memorandum Opinion and Order]. Minority

owners were permitted to own up to 25 stations in each service. Id. Further, non-minority broadcasters could exceed
the national limits by up to five, but only if such excess interests were non-controlling interests in minority or small business controlled AM or FM stations. Id.
36
47 C.F.R. § 73.3555(e) (1) (1995), in pertinent part,
states that no license for a commercial AM or FM station
"shall be granted to any party ... if the grant ... would
result in such party . .. owning, operating or controlling,

or having a cognizable interest in: (i) more than 20 AM,
or more than 20 FM stations, provided, however, that
minority controlled entities may acquire an additional
five stations per service above the national limit and that
multiple owners that are not minority controlled may
hold an attributable, but not controlling, interest in five
additional stations per service above the national limit
that are minority controlled or small business controlled."
37
Rules and Regs. Governing Experimental Television
Brdcst. Stations, 6 Fed. Reg. 2282, 2284-85 (1941) (codified
at former 47 C.F.R. § 4.226).
38
Rules Governing Brdcst. Services Other Than Std.
Brdcst., 9 Fed. Reg. 5442 (1944) (codified at former 47
C.F.R. § 4.226).
39
In Re Amendment of Television Brdcst. Stations Multi-
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and television. First, television became part of the
FCC's "Rule of Seven," so one entity could own a
maximum of seven stations, with no more than
five in the VHF band.39 Second, the proposed
abandonment of national limits was also made
with respect to television ownership caps in
1984.40 Similar to the case of radio, however, the
complete repeal of television ownership restrictions was rejected in favor of imposing a twelve
station limit.4 1 The Commission also adopted the
ancillary restriction of limiting a group owner's
access, via their television stations, to broadcasting
too no more than twenty-five percent of the national audience. 42 Although these were the limits
in effect when the 1996 Act was passed,43 the FCC
was in the process of considering various proposals to relax the national television ownership limitations.44
ple Ownership Regs., Report and Order, 43 F.C.C. 2797 (1954).
40

41

1984 Report and Order, supra note 26.
1985 Memorandum Opinion and Order, supra note 29,

para 52. The permissible limit for minorities and persons acquiring cognizable interest in minority owned and controlled
stations increased to 14. Id. para. 53.
42 Id. para. 52. National audience reach is determined
by dividing the total number of television households in the
Arbitron Area of Dominant Influence (ADI) markets where
the owner's stations are located by the total national television households according to ADI data. Id. note 52. Due to
limitations on signal reach, only 50% of UHF station's ADI
reach was counted. Id. para. 52. Also, single owners may
reach up to 30% of the national audience if five percent of
that reach is contributed to minority stations. Id. para. 53.
43 47 C.F.R. §. 7 3.3555(e) (1) (1995), in pertinent part,
states:
No license for a commercial . . . TV broadcast station
shall be granted to any party . . . if the grant . .. would
result in such party . .. owning, operating or controlling,
or having a cognizable interest in: . . . (ii) more than 14

television stations; or (iii) more than 12 television stations that are not minority-controlled. (2) No license
for a commercial TV broadcast station shall be
granted .

.

. to any party .

.

. if the grant .

.

. of such

license would result in such party ... owning, operating
or controlling, or having a cognizable interest in, either
(i) TV stations which have an aggregate national audience reach exceeding thirty (30) percent, or (ii) TV stations which have an aggregate national audience reach
exceeding twenty-five (25) percent and which are not
minority-controlled.
Id.

44 Spawned by a report from the Commission's Office of
Plans and Policy (FCC, OPP Working Paper No. 26, Brdcst.
TV in a Multichannel Marketplace, (authored by F. Setzer
andJ. Levy), 6 FCC Rcd. 3996 (1991)), which concluded new
competition to broadcast services provided additional
choices for consumers and increased competition for broadcast television, the FCC solicited comments on modifying the
ownership regulations. See generally In re Review of the Policy
Implications of the Changing Video Marketplace, Notice of In-
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Local Ownership Limits on Radio

In addition to concerns regarding nationwide
ownership, the FCC regulates duopolies, the common ownership of same service stations within any
one particular market. 45 Regulation of radio duopolies began in the 1940s, when the FCC completely banned such ownership scenarios.4 6 The
FCC's early proscription against duopolies is understandable given the Commission's literalist approach to maximizing diversity. In 1970, the FCC
explained that fifty-one licensees were more desirable then fifty; and if only fifty different entities

control an available sixty frequencies, then
sources of ideas are not maximized. 4 7
The Commission remained faithful to this position for some time. 4 8 Even while the FCC was endorsing the complete elimination of the national
ownership caps in the mid-1980s, it reiterated the
need for duopoly restrictions, concluding that loquiry, 6 FCC Rcd. 4961 (1991). As a follow up, the FCC issued In re Review of the Commission's Regs. Governing Television Brdcst., Notice ofProposedRule Making, 7 FCC Rcd. 4111
(1992) [hereinafter 1992 NPRM]. No modifications to the
rules were made as a result of the 1992 NPRM; however, in
1995, the Commission released a Further NPRM to consider
changes occurring since 1992. See generally 1995 FNPRM,
supra note 4. Specifically, the FCC's concern was that the increased availability of other media, such as cable, DBS, and
MMDS, diluted the need to regulate broadcast for the traditional purposes of achieving competition and diversity. Id.
paras. 12-13. For example, the FCC seeks to promote competition through its ownership caps in order to avoid market
abuse. See supra text accompanying note 24. The potential
for market abuse decreases as alternatives to products increase. 1995 FNPRM, supra note 4, para. 20. Accordingly,
with burgeoning broadcast substitutes, the FCC's need to
promote competition within broadcasting is dissipated. Id.
Secondly, the FCC seeks to promote diversity of viewpoints
through its ownership caps. See infra text accompanying note
23. This goal, however, becomes less vital as diversity in nonbroadcast media increases. 1995 FNPRM, supra note 4, para.
54. Accordingly, the FCC issued its 1995 FNPRM to "further
analyze economic and diversity issues with respect to the various proposals" and to revise its ownership rules, which included, for example, increasing the numerical caps and/or
the audience reach limitation. Id. at para. 14.
45 See 1995 FNPRM, supra note 4, para. 4.
46 Rules Governing Std. and High Frequency Brdcst. Stations, 5 Fed. Reg. 2382 (1940) (codified at former 47 C.F.R.
§ 3.288) restricted common ownership of FM stations. Id. at
2384. The FCC banned AM duopolies in Rules Governing
Std. and High Frequency Brdcst. Stations, 8 Fed. Reg. 16,065
(1943). Prior to these two regulations, the FCC just had a
policy against granting new licenses which would result in duopolies. In re Application for Constr. Permit of Radio Genesee Radio Corp., InitialDecision, 5 F.C.C. 183 (1938).
47
In re Amendment of Sections 73.35, 73.240 and 73.636
of the Comm'n Rules Relating to Multiple Ownership of Std.,
FM, and TV Brdcst. Stations, First Report and Order, 22
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cal markets were the appropriate venue for
achieving diversity.49
The FCC's strict adherence to its duopoly restriction, however, gave way to the same economic
considerations causing the Commission to relax
national radio caps in the early 1990s. In particular, increased competition from the growing numbers of radio stations and non-radio outlets resulted in economic hardship for the radio
industry.50 "In view of the increasingly fragmented nature of the local radio marketplace, the
economic strain experienced by many . . . radio

broadcasters, and the sizable savings that can stem
from joint operation of same-market radio facilities," the FCC adopted a new duopoly rule in
1992.51 The revised regulation limited an owner
from reaching more than 25% of the audience
and instituted numerical caps of three or four stations, depending on the market size. 5 2 Although
F.C.C.2d 306, para. 21 (1970) [hereinafter 1970 First Report
and Order].
48 Although the duopoly rules remained in effect for
more than 50 years before being significantly revised, the
standard for determining duopolies varied. In 1943, the
Commission reviewed requests for duopolies on a case by
case basis, considering, for example, the extent the stations'
service contours overlapped and the potential interference.
See 8 Fed. Reg. 16,065 (1943). In 1964, this case by case approach was replaced with a fixed standard. In re Amendment
of Sections 73.35, 73.240, and 73.636 of the Comm'n Rules
Relating to Multiple Ownership of Std., FM, and TV Brdcst.
Stations, Report and Order, 45 F.C.C. 1476 (1964), recon.
grantedin part and denied in part, 3 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 1554
(1964). A single entity could not own stations in the same
service area if the 1 mV/m contours overlapped. Id. at para.
1. See also 1991 NPRM, supra note 33, para. 17. In 1989, the
FCC modified its contour overlap limitations to prohibit one
entity from owning two AM stations with overlapping 5 mV/
m contours and two FM stations with overlapping 3.16 mV/m
contours. In re Amendment of Section 73.3555 of the
Comm'n Rules, the Brdcst. Multiple Ownership Rules, First
Report and Order, 4 FCC Rcd. 1723 (1989); See also 1991
NPRM, supra note 33, para. 18. Additional Commission rules
(47 C.F.R. §§ 73.24(J), 73.315(a)) require that the aforementioned contours encompass the entire principal community.
The effect of coupling these two rules was the prohibition on
owning two AM or two FM stations in the same principal city.
In Re Revision of Radio Rules and Policies, Memorandum
Opinion and Order and FurtherNotice of Proposed Rule Making, 7
FCC Rcd. 6387, n.30 (1992).
49 1985 Memorandum Opinion and Order, supra note 29,
n.22.
50 See supra note 33 and accompanying text; see also 1991
NPRM, supra note 33, paras. 1-3; see 1992 Report and Order,
supra note 34, para. 2.
51
Id. para. 40.
52 When the FCC first adopted this tiered approach, it
established four different markets with numerical caps of
three and four stations in the smaller two categories and five
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the FCC received petitions to reconsider its actions, the Commission refused to further amend
its rules, claiming that the relaxed restrictions
were too new to determine if they would create
undue market concentration and/or decreased
diversity.53 Accordingly, this two-tiered market
approach was in effect when Congress enacted
the 1996 Act.
D.

Local Ownership Limits on Television

As with the above restrictions, the Commission's regulation of television duopolies began in
1940. The initial restriction prohibited ownership
of two television stations broadcasting in substantially the same area. 5 4 In 1964, the Commission
replaced its "substantially the same area" approach with a more definitive standard. The new
rule prohibited common control of two stations if
it resulted in overlapping Grade B contours.5 5
This regulation survived almost thirty years
before being reconsidered. The FCC initiated a
rulemaking proceeding in the early 1990's to consider loosening the restrictions in light of the increased availability of other media.56 No changes
in the rule resulted, and the prohibition on Grade
and six stations in the larger markets. Id. para. 40. Upon
reconsideration, the Commission divided markets into just
two areas and reduced the numerical caps, resulting in the
following revised 47 C.F.R. § 73.3555(a) (1) (1995):
(a) (1) Radio Contour Overlap Rule. No license for an
AM or FM broadcasting station shall be granted to any
party (including all parties under common control if the
grant of such license will result in overlap of the principal community contour of that station and the principal
community contour of any other broadcasting station directly or indirectly owned, operated, or controlled by
the same party, except that such license may be granted
in connection with a transfer or assignment from an existing party with such interests, or in the following circumstances:
(i) In radio markets with 14 or fewer commercial radio stations, a party may own up to 3 commercial radio stations, no more than 2 of which are in the same
service (AM or FM), provided that the owned stations,
if other than a single AM and FM station combination,
represent less than 50% of the stations in the market.
(ii) In radio markets with 15 or more commercial radio stations, a party may own up to 2 AM and 2 FM
commercial stations, provided, however, that evidence
that grant of any application will result in a combined
audience share exceeding 25% will be considered
prima facie inconsistent with the public interest.
(iii) Overlap between two stations in different services
is permissible if neither of those two stations overlaps
a third station in the same service.

[VoL 5

B contour overlap was the duopoly rule existing
when the 1996 Act was passed.5 7
One-To-A-Market Rule

E.

In contrast to the turbulence in the above discussed limitations, the FCC's one-to-a-market rule,
proscribing the common ownership of a radio
and television station in the same local market,58
reflects a more consistent history. In 1970, motivated by the continuous concerns of diversity and
competition, the Commission adopted its one-toa-market rule.5 9 Nearly twenty years later, two
events prompted the Commission to revisit this
cross-ownership ban. First, the increase in broadcasting outlets lessened the FCC's concern with
competition, 60 and second, the realization that increased supply does not necessarily result in commonality of viewpoints.61 As a result, the Commission announced it would consider granting
waivers to the one-to-a-market restriction under
certain conditions.62 Waivers were favored if the
resultant television-radio combination occurred
in one of the top twenty-five television markets
and thirty separate broadcast licensees remained
after the combination, or if the waiver request
53 1994 Second Memorandum Opinion and Order, see
supra note 35, para. 39.
54 Rules and Regs. Governing Experimental TV Brdcst.
Stations, 5 Fed. Reg. at 2384 (1940). See also 1992 NPRM,
supra note 44, n.27.
55 In re Amendment of Sections 73.35, 73.240, and
73.636 of the Comm'n's Rules Relating to Multiple Ownership of Std., FM, and TV Brdcst. Stations, Report and Order,45
F.C.C 1476, paras. 9-12 (1964), on reconsideration,3 Rad. Reg.
2d (P & F) 1554 (1964). The Commission adopted this test
at the same time it implemented the fixed contour overlap
standards for radio. The FCC noted that television had
greater impact and fewer channels then radio, therefore, was
being subjected to a more restrictive overlap requirement.
Id. at 1484.
56 See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
57 47 C.F.R. § 73.3555(b) (1995).
58 47 C.F.R. § 7 3.3555(c) (1995).
59

1970 First Report and Order, supra note 47, n.15. The

following year, the FCC lifted the restriction with respect to
the formation and transfer of AM/FM combinations. In re
Amendment of Sections 73.35, 73.240 and 73.636 of the
Comm'n Rules Relating to Multiple Ownership of Std., FM
and TV Brdcst. Stations, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 28

F.C.C.2d 662 (1971).
60
In re Amendment of Section 73.3555 of the Comm'n

Brdcst. Multiple Ownership Rules, Second Report and Order, 4
FCC Rcd. 1741, para. 19 (1989), modified by Memorandum

Opinion and Order, 4 FCC Rcd. 6489, para. 26 (1989).
61
62

Id.

Id.
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concerned a failed station.63 If neither of these
conditions were present, the Commission would
review the waiver request by evaluating and balancing five criteria.64
At the time the 1996 Act was passed, the FCC
was contemplating liberalizing the one-to-a-market rule. 65 Before the rule making proceeding
was complete, however, Congress passed the 1996
Act. Accordingly, the one-to-a-market rule, with
the waiver policy discussed in the preceding paragraph, was effective when the 1996 Act was
signed. 66
II.

BROADCAST OWNERSHIP LIMITATIONS
AFTER THE 1996 ACT

In an effort to promote competition and deregulate the telecommunication industry, Congress, via the 1996 Act, directed the FCC to severely relax the broadcast ownership
restrictions.67 The following explains the changes
implemented by the new legislation and the Congressional justifications therefore.
A.

National Ownership Limits on Radio

The 1996 Act completely erases all limitations
on the number of radio stations any one party
may own nationally.68 The reasoning underlying
such a drastic measure is that the objectives of radio ownership regulation have been obtained.
Congress appeared satisfied that the existence of
11,000 radio stations nationwide, and an average
of twenty-five radio options within each market,
evidenced that appropriate levels of competition
and diversity were achieved.69 The Legislature's
63 Id. A failed station is one which has not been operated for four months or more or is involved in a bankruptcy
proceeding. Id. para. 86.
64 Id. The Commission will determine if the proposed
combination is in the public interest by reviewing the "types
of facilities involved, the potential benefits of the combination, the number of stations already owned by the applicant,
the financial difficulties of the station(s), and the nature of
the market in light of . . . diversity and competition." Id.

para. 90.
65 1995 FNPRM, see supra note 4, paras. 131-32. The
Commission was entertaining two proposals for modifying
the one-to-a-market rule. Id. at 131. First, the FCC would
eliminate the rule entirely if radio and television stations did
not compete in the same advertising, program delivery, or
diversity markets. Id. Instead of the one-to-a-market rule, the
local ownership restrictions would function to promote diversity and competition. Id. If radio and television did compete
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consensus was that in such an environment, "arbitrary limitations on broadcast ownership ...

are

necessary."70

Apparently, Senator
no longer
in declaring
Congress
a
collective
Bums spoke for
that "radio operators are ready to . . . operate

without stifling ownership rules. They need total
deregulation to allow them to compete in the new
digital marketplace." 7 '
B.

National Ownership Limits on Television

The 1996 Act took a similarly drastic approach
to relaxing the limitations on nationwide television ownership. As in radio, there is no longer
any numerical cap on the quantity of broadcast
television stations permitted to be under common
ownership. 72 The Legislature's reasoning for this
change echoes that supporting the repeal of national radio caps. A 30% increase in the number
of television stations in the last ten years, coupled
with competition from cable, low power television
("LPTV"), satellite master antenna television service ("SMATV"), direct broadcast satellite
("DBS"), and video cassette recorders ("VCRs"),
caused Congress to eliminate restrictions on the
number of stations an entity may own nationwide.7 3
The expanding video market, however, was not
enough to instill Congress with a pure laissez-faire
attitude. Congress refused to abandon the restriction on the national audience reach; however, it
did increase the limitation from 25% to 35%.74
Even in retaining this restriction, however, Congress exhibited some deregulatory intent by not
dictating how audience reach should be measured. Accordingly, in November, 1996, the FCC
in the aforementioned areas, however, the FCC would allow
radio-television combinations in markets where alternative
suppliers would ensure competition and diversity. Id. at
para. 132.
66 47 C.F.R. § 73.3555(c) and note 7.
67 The 1996 Act, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (codified at 47 U.S.C.A. § 151 (West Supp. 1996)).
68 Id. § 202(a).
69 S.R. Rep. No. 104-23 (1995).
70 H.R. Rep. No. 104-204 (1995).
71 S.R. Rep. No. 104-23 (1995).
72 The 1996 Act, Pub. L. No. 104-104, § 202(c), 110 Stat.
56 (codified at 47 U.S.C.A. § 151 (West Supp. 1996)).
73 H.R. Rep. 104-204 (1995).
74 The 1996 Act, Pub. L. No. 104-104, § 202(c) (1) (B),
110 Stat. 56 (codified at 47 U.S.C.A. § 151 (West Supp.
1996)).
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issued a Notice of Proposed Rule Making to solicit
comments on how to calculate the revised 35%
limitation.7 5 The Commission's objective in seeking comments was to implement the Congressional directive while continuing to promote competition and diversity.76
C.

Local Ownership Limits on Radio

In addition to the above changes regarding national limitations, Congress modified the restrictions placed on local radio ownership. Although
the 1996 Act retains the market tier framework
adopted by the FCC in 1992,7 it creates four market categories, vice two, and increases the ownership caps depending on each market's size.78 The
following chart illustrates the new regulation:79
Maximum Number
Number of
of Stations in the
Commercial Radio
Maximum Number
Same Service (AM
Stations in the
of Stations One
or FM)
Market
Party May Own
5
8
45 or More
4
7
30 to 44
4
6
15 to 29
3
5*
14 or fewer
*Limitation: A party may not own more than 50% of the stations
in the market.

Congress did allow the Commission some
discretion in administering these requirements.
The Commission may allow an individual to
exceed these thresholds if the result is an
increased number of operating radio stations.s0
The Legislature's intermediate approach of
liberalizing the local ownership restraints, but
rejecting their complete elimination, is a
compromise between two viewpoints. Those
opposed to increasing local ownership caps
warned such action was "ill-advised . . . until a

more thorough analysis of the consequences such
deregulation is already having on localism and
competition has been completed.""' Conversely,
deregulation advocates assert that ownership
75
In re Brdcst. TV National Ownership Rules, Notice of
Proposed Rule Making in MM Dkt. No. 96-222, FCC 96-437
(Nov. 7, 1996). The three issues on which the FCC sought
comment were: (1) whether to include the ownership of satellite stations in measuring ownership; (2) whether to count
LMAs in determining audience reach; and (3) whether to retain or replace the use of Arbitron's Areas of Dominant Influence ("ADIs") in defining markets. Id. at para. 1.
76 In re Brdcst. TV National Ownership Rules, Notice of
Proposed Rule Making in MM Dkt. No. 96-221, FCC 96-438

(Nov. 7, 1996).
77 See supra notes 51-52 and accompanying text.
78 The 1996 Act, Pub. L. No. 104-104, § 202(b) (1), 110
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restrictions should be fully eliminated in order to
allow radio operators to obtain economies of scale

efficiencies.8
D.

2

Local Ownership Limits on Television

In contrast to national ownership caps, and local radio ownership limitations, restraints on local
television ownership escaped Congressional control. Instead of mandating a complete abandonment or setting new numerical limits, Congress directed the FCC to conduct a rule making
proceeding in order to determine the fate of local
television ownership rules.83 The Congressional
intent behind this directive is that the "FCC
should revise the rule as is necessary to ensure
that broadcasters are able to compete fairly with
other media providers while ensuring that the
public receives information from a diversity of
media voices." 4
The FCC obeyed orders and is seeking comments on the revision of its television duopoly
rule.8 5 In particular, the FCC is considering replacing the current restriction on Grade B contour overlap with a ban on DMA/Grade A contour overlap.8 6 Further, the Commission seeks
comments on possible exceptions to the television
duopoly rule. 7
E.

One-To-A-Market Rule

The pervasive 1996 Act did not forget the oneto-a-market restriction. Congress directed the
FCC to extend its liberal waiver policy, previously
encompassing the top twenty-five markets, to the
top fifty markets.88 In response to this legislative
instruction, and the 1996 changes to the local radio ownership rules, the FCC is seeking comment
on several proposals to change or eliminate its
Stat. 56.(codified at 47 C.F.R. § 73.3555(A)(1) (1996)).
79 Id.
80 Id. § 202(b) (2).
81 H.R. Rep. No. 104-204 (1995).
82
141 CONG. REc. S 8424 (1995).
83
The 1996 Act, Pub. L. No. 104-104, § 202(c) (2), 110
Stat. 56 (codified at 47 U.S.C.A. § 151 (West Supp. 1996)).
84
142 CONG. REc. H 1145 (1996).
85
1996 Second FNPRM, see supra note 7.
86
Id. para. 92.
87
Id. paras. 29-55.
88
The 1996 Act, Pub. L. No. 104-104, § 202, 110 Stat. 56
(codified at 47 U.S.C.A. § 151 (West Supp. 1996)).
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one-to-a-market rule.8 9
III.

CONGRESSIONAL MYOPIA

In completely "renovating" the broadcast ownership regulations in the 1996 Act, Congress
made the following "mistakes of short sighted
man."90
A.

Congress Blinded by Deregulatory Zeal

First, the Legislature allowed its obsessions to
displace its logic. Specifically, Congress' fixation
with deregulating the telecommunication industry was inappropriately applied to broadcasting.
The fact that the 1996 Act is over-inclusive is
blatantly apparent upon reading the first sentence
of the legislation. The proffered purpose of the
1996 Act is to "promote competition and reduce
regulation in order to secure lower prices and
higher quality services for American telecommunications consumers and encourage the rapid deployment of new telecommunications technologies."9 1 This statement of purpose, while
motivated by good intentions, is inapplicable to
broadcasting. Although the reduction of ownership restrictions is clearly deregulatory, and economic theory supports that increased competition
results in decreased prices,92 the operative prepositional phrase is "in order to."
The first intended effect is lower prices for consumers.93 It is difficult to envision how prices can
get any lower in the broadcast medium, as radio
and television are already free.94 In return for
89 1996 Second FNPRM, supra note 7, paras. 62-79.
90 See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
91 The 1996 Act, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (codified at 47 U.S.C.A. § 151 (West Supp. 1996)).
92
See generally PAUL A. SAMUELSON & WILLIAM D.
NoRDHAus, ECONOMICS 56-61, (1989).
93 See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
94 1995 FNPRM, supra note 4, paras. 68, 115;
"[B]roadcast television . . . can be received free of charge

through the air with a standard television set and antenna."
Ameritech Corp. v. U.S., 867 F. Supp. 721 (1994). The same
prerequisites allow consumers to enjoy broadcast radio free
of charge. The 1992 Cable Act's "must-carry" provisions, requiring cable operators to carry local television stations, were
enacted to preserve access to free television programming for
the 40% of Americans without cable. Turner Broad. Sys.,
Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622 (1994).
95 "Viewers may be said to pay for over-the-air television
through their purchase of advertised products, a portion of
the price of which reflects the cost of advertising - including
television advertising. Also, the consumer must first
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free broadcasting, consumers are said to pay indirect costs such as purchasing products advertised
over the airwaves and allocating time to the medium.95 The deregulation of ownership limits,
however, will not result in any savings to these indirect costs of the consumer. Such costs exist independent of who owns, operates, or controls the
source of the broadcast. In fact, the 1996 Act, in
application, is functioning to increase the indirect
cost of advertising. The decrease in ownership restriction has generated an increase in monopolies.9 6 Mergers allow broadcasters to dominate
markets and thereby gain bargaining power over
advertisers. The powerful broadcasters can "force
advertisers to buy "tie-ins" where they are only allowed to buy on top-ranked stations if they make
buys on lower-ranked stations at the same time."97
Any increase in cost born by the advertiser will be
reflected in the price of goods and services and is,
therefore, passed on to the consumer.
The second goal advanced in the statement of
purpose is to provide consumers with higher quality services.98 In the broadcasting arena, the presumed equation under which the FCC operates is
competition + diversity = quality.99 Accordingly,
the two addends are directly proportional to the
sum, quality. Unfortunately, the relaxation of
ownership limits is resulting in less competition
and, consequently, less diversity in the broadcasting marketplace.100
Given that the 1996 Act's express purpose does
not reflect achievable goals in the broadcast
arena, one may think it useful to investigate the
legislative history to obtain a deeper understandpurchase a television set in order to receive over-the-air programming and allocate viewing time, at least part of which is

likely spent viewing commercials. Thus, viewers pay several
indirect costs in return for 'free' television. However, they
are not the sort of direct payment that must be made for subscription services." 1995 NPRM, supra note 4, n.91. These indirect costs are similarly applicable to radio.
96
See infra notes 111-126 and accompanying text.
97 Justice Begins Radio Probe, No. 5, Vol. 4, MEDIA Daily
(Aug. 2, 1996). One source claims the motivation for Westinghouse to recently buy out Infinity (see infra notes 115-16
and accompanying text), was to control radio pricing in its
markets. Id.
98 See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
99 See supra notes 5, 6, and 18 and accompanying text.

The FCC's commitment to the ideals of competition and diversity suggests that a broadcast system which achieved such
goals would be a quality system.
100 See infra notes 111-126 and accompanying text and
notes 139-152 and accompanying text.
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ing of Congress' motivation for addressing broadcasting ownership in the legislation. Unfortunately, delving into this history only underscores
the inappropriateness of applying the 1996 Act's
objectives to broadcasting.
The drafters of the 1996 Act continuously
stated that the new legislation was needed to replace the outdated Communications Act of
1934.101 For example, one commentator's justification for the legislation was that "America continues to operate under an antiquated regulatory
regime. Our current regulatory scheme in
America simply does not take many dramatic technological changes into account." 0 2 Similarly, one
reformer phrased his mission as reforming an
"outmoded and antiquated, regulatory apartheid
system in order to make exciting new information, telecommunications and entertainment services available for America."103
Again, these statements are facially void of any
need to relax ownership restrictions. They show
overwhelming interest in new technologies, not
broadcasting. Granted, new technologies affect
broadcasting in that they create a more competitive environment by presenting alternatives to the
media consumer. In fact, this is the oft cited rationale of the FCC in explaining its historic increases of ownership ceilings. 0 4 It is a presumptive leap of logic, however, to conclude that
increased competition warrants complete abandonment of national ownership caps which have
existed for over half a century. Even the highly
deregulatory FCC of the 1980's, recognizing "that
the communications marketplace [was] undergoing rapid change," realized that "[p] rudence and
caution

. . . [required] a transition that pro-

vide [d] for monitoring and special scrutiny of
sharp departures from the current status of the
broadcast industry." 0 5 The recent legislation is a
prime example of Congress throwing caution to
the wind.
101

142 CONG. REc. S 2207 (1996).

Mr. Pressler, reading

from his article, "Telecom Reform: It Ain't Over 'Til It's
Over," "Congress had been so long about the business of updating the nation's antiquated communications laws. . ." 142
CONG REc. S 686 (1996); "The purpose of this bill is to update the 1934 Communications Act. This is the first complete
rewrite of the telecommunications law in our country. It is
very much needed." 141 CONG REc. S 15144 (1995); "We are
in a situation today that our Nation very much needs to modernize its telecommunications laws." 141 CONG REc. S 7881
(1995); "The telecommunications industry . . . is regulated

under a §et of laws that are antiquated and never designed to
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Deregulation of Ownership Restrictions
Destroys Broadcasting Ideals

The effect of including broadcasting in the
over-sized umbrella of the 1996 Act, is that the
concept of "the public interest"106 is drowning.
Although competition cannot achieve the legislation's stated ends of lower prices and increased
quality, 07 Congress may have believed competition would serve other goals. The 1996 Act, however, is not increasing competition. Instead, Congress, in an attempt to promote competition, has
triggered a destructive chain of events which has
resulted in an increased concentration of ownership. 08 The centralized ownership of broadcast
stations threatens the public interest by detrimentally affecting localism and diversity.' 0 9 Accordingly, by enacting the 1996 Act, Congress legislated in the private interest and placed a heavy
burden of the FCC's ability to regulate in the public interest.' 'o
1.

Merger Mania = Decreased Competition

Since the inception of ownership limitations,
"competition" is the word that's been offered to
justify their existence.' 1 Accordingly, the theory
is that competition is achieved by placing ceilings
on ownership, thus providing increased opportunities for multiple players to enter the broadcast
marketplace. Logic dictates that if this theory is
effective, the inverse would also be true - fewer
participants will enter the broadcasting arena
when ownership restrictions are increased or
eliminated, thus competition will not be achieved.
This hypothesis is proven upon an examination of
the events since the deregulatory legislation.
During the first month of the 1996 Act's existence, over $2 billion in radio station transactions
took place;112 in comparison the same sum was
spent on such deals during an entire year in the
handle the challenges of today's industry."
102
141 CONG. Ric. S 7881, S 7886 (1995).
103
104
105
106
107

108

109
110
111
112

Id. at 7886.
See supra notes 33 and 50 and accompanying text.
1984 Report and Order, supra note 26, para. 109.
See supra note 11.
See supra notes 93-100 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 111-126 and accompanying text.

See infra notes 124-148 and accompanying text.
See supra note 11.

See supra notes 18 and 22 and accompanying text.
Peter K. Pitsch, An 'Innovation Age" Perspectiveon Tele-
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1980's. 13
This first month was indicative of the events to
follow. Most significantly, Infinity, the second
largest radio group, merged with the even larger
Westinghouse/CBS, the latter paying $4.9 billion
for the buyout." 4 As a result of the largest acquisition in radio history, Westinghouse/CBS now
owns fifty FM stations and thirty-three AM stations
throughout sixteen markets, and has sixty-nine of
its eighty-three outlets in the largest ten markets.115 Clear Channel Communications, however, after purchasing Heftel Broadcasting, has an
even more pervasive presence owning 108 radio
stations. 16

While these high-dollar transactions are placing
their initiators on the leading edge in large markets, they are also fueling the strategies behind
other mergers. Benchmark Communications, for
example, is buying stations in smaller markets
where it can avoid wrestling with the oversized
Westinghouse/CBS." 7 The company is interested in maximizing its control not by number of
stations owned, but in terms of controlling a large
percentage of the markets in which it operates."18
The radio station buying spree is even trickling
down to the state and city level. Paxson Commucommunications Mergers (last visisted April 27, 1997) <http://
www. cse.org/cse/pitch.html>.
113
Id.
114
Chuck Taylor, Telecommunications Act Defined Year In
Radio Station Sales And Mergers, WKTU, Internet Top '96 News,
BILLBOARD, Dec. 28, 1996.
115
Chuck Taylor, Westinghouse, Infinity Merger Fuels Consolidation Concerns, BILLBOARD, Jul. 6, 1996.
116 Id.
117 Timothy J. Mullaney, On-the-air Niche; Radio: Two Entrepreneurs Turned Their Backs on Cable TV to go on a Timely Buying Spree in Radioland,BALTImORE SUN, Sept. 23, 1996, at 13C.
118

Id.

Paxson Cranks up the Radio: West Palm Company's Acquisition Blitz Continues, BROWARD DAILY Bus. REv., Dec. 20, 1996,
at A16.
120 Evergreen Media Acquires WPNT Chicago; Provides Evergreen With Fifth Full PowerFM Signal in Chicago, BUSINESS WIRE,
July 18, 1996, at 1.
121
Chuck Taylor, Telecommunications Act Defined Year In
Radio Station Sales And Mergers, WKTU, Internet Top '96 News,
BILLBOARD, Dec. 28, 1996. The plethora of activity is described by the following statements on the merger mania:
"One glance through [Billboard Magazine's] pages in any
given week in 1996, and you're bound to have seen the words
"buy," "sell" or "swap."" Id.; "The starting gun went off for
the latest wave of television mergers with the passage of the
Telecommunications Act of 1996." Mark Gimein, Groups
Look to Cut Costs, Set the Pace,MEDIAWEEK, Sept. 9, 1996, Vol. 6,
No. 37, at MQ28; "With the signing of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, a flurry of acquisitions in the radio industry
119
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nications recently increased its station ownership
from fifteen to thirty-nine outlets, all within Florida. 19 Similarly, as a result of relaxed ownership
restrictions, Evergreen Media Corporation now
owns six FM stations in the Chicago market. 12 0
The above examples are far from an exhaustive
list of the transactions occurring since the passage
of the 1996 legislation. This fact is exemplified by
the statistic that before the Act's nine-month anniversary, 1,175 stations were traded,121 and the
merger-mania trend is not subsiding.122
Although numerical restrictions on national television ownership were also eliminated by the
1996 Act, the buying frenzy in this medium has
not reached the same heights as in radio.123
Nonetheless, there is still a wealth of activity resulting in a more concentrated ownership of television. Paxson Communication now owns 48 television stations;124 Sinclair Broadcast Group, after
purchasing River City Broadcasting, operates
twenty-eight stations;125 and numerous other
mergers have resulted in similar scenarios.126 The
decrease in competition, evidenced by this categorical data, is generating a decline in localism
and diversity.

has taken place." Peter Heerwagen, Changing tunes of the radio industry, QUAD-STATE BUs. J., Sept. 1996, Vol 7; No 11, at
17.
122 In February, 1997, Evergreen Media, Chancellor
Broadcasting, and Viacom announced their plans to form
Chancellor Media Corp., which would own 103 stations in 21
markets. "The transaction is the latest in a series of buyouts
that is transforming the radio industry .. . all over the country." Paul Farhi, Radio Deal to Pool 11 Area Stations, WASH.
POST, Feb. 19, 1997, at D10.
123
Elizabeth A. Rathbun, Networks Take Station-Buying
Breather; Television Station Acquisitions, BROADCASTING &
CABLE, Apr. 8, 1996, at 41. (explaining that the television industry is "taking a breather from recent year-end activity" to
restructure and prepare for the buying surge which will follow the lull).
124 Paxson Cranks up the Radio: West Palm Company's Acquisition Blitz Continues, BROwARD DAILY BUS. REv., Dec. 20,
1996, at A16.
125 Digby Larner, In Today's Multimedia Game, Spotlight Is
on Management; Riding the High-Tech Roller Coaster-Without Losing Your Balance, INT'L HERALD TRIB., Aug. 10, 1996, Money
Report.
126 A sampling of transactions during 1996: Gannett
bought Multimedia Entertainment and now operates 15 TV
stations; A. H. Belo Corp. purchased Providence Journal Co.,
giving them 16 television stations; Tribune Company bought
Renaissance Communications and now has 16 television stations, accessing one-third of America's TV households.
Merger Mania in the Telecommunications Industry, CEP Report,
Jan. 26, 1997.
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2.

Localism in Danger

The principle of localism has guided the FCC
and the judiciary in promulgating regulations and
rendering decisions respectively.' 2 7 It apparently
did not, however, guide Congress in its decision
to dramatically loosen ownership restraints.
The consolidation of ownership resulting from
the 1996 Act necessarily increases the number of
absentee owners of broadcast stations. This end
effect does not in itself threaten localism; therefore, it is important to consider the effect it does
have. What motivates parties to be absentee owners? Money. "The reigning mentality [of group
owners is] . . . cut costs, squeeze money from the

new properties and fight for every last dollar."1 28
Successful localism demands comprehensive
newscasts and plentiful public affairs programming.12 9 The group broadcast owners cannot
concurrently pump money into local programming and "squeeze money" from their new stations concurrently. The results of this penny
pinching will be to justify the fears that "formats
will serve the most profitable demographics only
and that syndicated programming will become a
cost-saving mainstay, prompting a decline in localization." 30
Since the absentee owner is motivated by
money, he is disinterested in the burdened of
non-transferable debt.'13 Accordingly, the "new
barons of radio . .. convert their stations from lo-

cal presences into cash cows for instant milking,
their values ballooned for trading to the next
buyer." 32 Concluding that this process results in
decreased localism is difficult to challenge when
group owners themselves admit, "It's commodity
127 Benjamin M. Compaine, The Impact of Ownership on
Content: Does it Matter? 13 CARDOzo ARTs & ENT L.J. 755, 761

(1995).
128

Mark Gimein, Groups Look to Cut Costs, Set the Pace,

MEDIAWEEK, Sept. 9, 1996, at MQ28.
129 Prior to enacting the 1996 Act,

Representative Hollings cautioned that "[a] ny modification in the national ownership cap is important because of localism concerns. Local
television stations provide vitally important services in our
communities. Because local programming informs our citizens about natural disasters, brings news of local events, and
provides other community-building benefits, we cannot afford to undermine this valuable local resource." 141 CONG.
REc. S 7896 (June 7, 1995). "Localism permits broadcasters
to tailor their programming to the needs and interests of
their communities." 104 H. R. 204 (July 24, 1995).
130
Chuck Taylor, Westinghouse, Infinity Merger Fuels Consolidation Concerns, BILLBOARD, July 6, 1996.

[Vol. 5

trading to us. We don't know [our] community.
We're short-term players."133
Congress has accelerated the demise of localism by increasing the permissible audience reach
of television station owners to 35%. The relaxed
ceiling is an invitation for national television networks to increase their ownership of local stations.1 34 Localism is certainly not achieved by
transforming local broadcast stations into "passive
conduits for network transmissions from New
York." 35
Congress also constructed a hurdle to the preservation of localism over the radio spectrum. Due
to the new liberal duopoly rules, radio purchasers
justify the astronomical price tags of group ownership by reasoning they will decrease costs by consolidating resources and eliminating redundant
employees.136 Unfortunately for localism, the
news and public affairs departments are often the
first areas of downsizing. In many instances, the
once averred local radio newscast has been abandoned in favor of one individual reading "news
and weather supplied to all clients by a single
news source, the Associated Press."137 There is
hardly anything more juxtaposed to localism then
mass produced news.
The decrease in localism is occurring at a time
when it is the most needed. Congress reasons
that the increased availability of other media warrants decreased ownership caps in broadcasting.
The competing video media (e.g. multipoint distribution service, satellite master antenna television systems, direct broadcast satellites), however,
are national providers not purveyors of local programming. 3 8

1s1
132

142 CONG. REc. S 6108 (June 11, 1996).
Id.

133

Id.

104 H. R. 204 (July 24, 1995) (saying "Deregulation
of the audience cap will intensify concentration in the hands
of the vertically-integrated, national television networks.")
'35
104 H. R. 204 (July 24, 1995)
134

Peter Heerwagen, Changing Tunes of the Radio Industry, QUAD-STATE Bus. J., Sept., 1996, at 17.
137 142 CONG. REc. S 6108 (June 11, 1996). "The name
136

of the game is to avoid being the 'last sucker' stuck with debt
if recession hits."
138
1995 FNPRM, supra note 4, para. 67. "[T]hese systems carry primarily entertainment programming, [however], [s]ome will offer national and international news but,
with the exception of [Direct Broadcast Satellite], none have
public interest obligations." Id.
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3. Diversity Threatened
Diversity is equally important as localism in
broadcasting. The actual definition of diversity,
however, has changed over time. In earlier days,
the Commission's objective appeared to be solely
a diversity of sources.
In adopting the "Rule of Seven," the FCC stated
its goal was a diversity of sources.139 In 1965, the
Commission explained comparative hearings existed to achieve diversification of control. 140
Words such as "sources" and "control" lead some
to believe the objective is simply diversity of ownership. For example, one writer explains the objective as an "effort to diversify the sources of information coming to the electorate; it is not
aimed at diversifying programming or viewpoints."141 Followers of this view would argue that
the Commission sought program diversity
through regulations such as the Prime Time Access Rule 142 and the Fairness Doctrine.143 Because these two doctrines no longer exist, 144 diversity may encompass more than varied ownership.
In fact, the FCC's own language supports this interpretation. The Commission's justification for
the one-to-a-market rule is the promotion of program diversity. 145 A fair compromise between the
two definitions is that the FCC seeks a broad ownership base to maximize opportunities for diverse
viewpoints. The fact that the 1996 Act did not
provide a foundation for widespread ownership is
already established, therefore, the Act's potential
effects on diverse viewpoints must be examined.
The FCC has advanced the ideal of diversity as a
justification for restraints on competition for over
139 In re Amendment of Sections 3.35, 3.240 and 3.636
of the Rules and Regs. relating to Multiple Ownership of AM,
FM and TV Brdcat. Stations, Report and Order, 9 Rad. Reg. (P
& F) 1563, para. 10 (1953).
140 Policy Statement on Comparative Brdcst. Hearings,
Public Notice, 1 F.C.C.2d 393, 394 (1965).
141 Henry Geller, Ownership Regulatory Policies in the U.S.
Telecomsector, 13 CARDozo ARTS AND ENT. L.J. 727, 730 (1995).
142 47 C.F.R. § 73.658(k) (1993) (The Prime-Time Access Rule allowed networks to only program 3 hours during
prime time).
143 Red Lion Broad. Co., v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
The Court upheld the constitutionality of the Fairness Doctrine (which required broadcasters to provide adequate and
fair coverage of public issues) because the scarce spectrum
justified this public interest regulation.
144 The FCC repealed the Fairness Doctrine as it found
the abundance of media outlets rendered the scarcity rationale obsolete. The Commission determined the doctrine was
no longer necessary to ensure public access to the marketplace of ideas. In re Complaint of Syracuse Peace Council
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fifty-five years.1 4r Further, this theory received judicial endorsement on numerous occasions. 147
However, the legislature either does not buy into
this long standing principle, presumes the existence of alternative media sources satisfies the diversity goal, or believes both alternatives.
The legislative history supports that, at a minimum, Congress' actions were motivated by the
proliferation of media outlets.14 8 Admittedly, the
plethora of mediums available in today's telecommunication industry provides a marketplace of
ideas on a global scale. This does not, however,
serve as a substitute for the need of broadcasting
to be diverse in and of itself. Although cable television is, in many aspects, a substitute for broadcast television,149 cable's distinguishing features
preclude it from being fairly considered in the diversity analysis. Unlike broadcast television, cable
requires consumers pay a subscription fee and engenders limited public interest obligations.150 In
addition to these inherent differences between
broadcast and television, broadcasting is a much
more available medium. Only two-thirds of individuals who have access to cable actually subscribe.15 1 This statistic magnifies the inappropriateness of Congress in relying on newer
technologies, such as DBS and MMDS. If cable,
"a mature technology that is well-established and
well-entrenched in the media marketplace,"15 2 is
only desired by 66% (i.e. two-thirds) of those with
access, then the less established and pervasive mediums of DBS and MMDS, are surely not serving
as broadcast substitutes to the consumer. In
short, Congress' macro approach to diversity inagainst Television Station WTVH Syracuse, New York, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 2 FCC Rcd. 5043 n.88 (1987). In
1995, the FCC repealed the Prime Time Access Rule, determining it was no longer in the public interest given the existence of cable, satellite systems, and VCRs. In re Review of the
Prime Time Access Rule, Report and Order, 11 FCC Rcd. 546
(1995).
145
1996 Second FTPRM, supra note 7, para. 59.
146 See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
147
U.S. v. Storer Broad., 351 U.S. 192 (1956); NBC v.
U.S., 319 U.S. 190 (1943); FCC v. Nat'l Citizens for Broad.,
436 U.S. 775 (1978).
148 See infra note 193.
149 1995 FNPRM, supra note 4, para. 66.
150 Id. (saying "An over-the-air broadcast television station is required to provide programming responsive to issues
facing its local community, afford equal opportunities to
political candidates, and to provide reasonable access to candidates for federal elective office.")
151

Id.

152

Id. para. 70.

282

CO2IMMLAW CONSPECTUS

vites devastating consequences for the micro-media focused consumer.
IV.

CONGRESS VIOLATED EQUAL
PROTECTION

The Constitution's Equal Protection clause forbids the government to "deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws." 15 3 The clause "is essentially a direction that
all persons similarly situated should be treated
alike."15 4 The following discussion demonstrates
that radio and television are indeed similarly situated. Accordingly, Congress violated the equal
protection guarantee of the Fifth Amendment 55
by allowing a single television station owner
greater audience reach then a single radio station
owner.
A.

The Disparate Treatment of Radio
and Television

The 1996 Act eliminated all national numerical
ownership caps on radio and television; however,
it restricts one television owner from reaching
more than 35% of the national audience.' 5 6 Conversely, a single radio station owner is not limited
by any such national audience cap. Although the
limitations on radio ownership within each specific market function to limit one owner's national numerical ownership,1 5 7 this is a separate
and distinct issue from national audience penetration. Accordingly, the current ownership regulations limit the speaker, who seeks to convey his
message through an audio-visual medium, to
reach 35% of the population, and allow purveyors
of purely aural messages to be heard by all.
A simple example illustrates the unequal treatment. The smallest market category set forth in
the rules on local radio ownership is a market
U.S. Const. amend. XIV.
154
Cruzan v. Missouri Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 287
n.12 (1990).
155
Equal protection analysis is the same under both the
Fourteenth and Fifth Amendment; therefore, this article includes cites to state equal protection cases in discussing federal violations of equal protection. See Weinberg v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 638 n.2 (1975). See also Schlesinger v.
Ballard, 419 U.S. 498 (1975); Jimenez v. Weinberger, 417
U.S. 628 (1974); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677
(1073).
156 The 1996 Act, Pub. L. No. 104-104, §§ 202(a),
153
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with "14 or fewer commercial radio stations."15 8
In this scenario, a party may own "up to 5 commercial radio stations, not more than 3 of which
are in the same service (AM or FM), except that a
party may not own . . more than fifty percent of
the stations in such market."159 In a two-radio station market, a party could own one station, due to
the 50% restriction. In a one-radio station market, the 50% rule would have no effect, therefore,
anyone could own that station. There is no concern with exceeding national ownership limits or
audience reach restrictions, as these types of restraints are not placed on radio.160 As a result,
creating the most restrictive scenario, a single
party may own at least one station in every market.
It follows that such an individual's message is
available to all of America. Alternatively, the purchaser who invests his assets in television, can only
speak to 35% of the nation.' 6 ' This example evidences the Congressional favoritism of audio
messages over audio-visual communication.
Viewing the above scenario from an alternative
perspective of diversity, it is possible that the end
result of deregulating ownership restrictions
would have been to favor the speech of television,
instead of radio, broadcasters. Congress invited
the FCC to eliminate all restraints on the number
of television stations a party could own locally.1 6 2
If Congress' myopia was contagious, and the FCC
accepted the invitation, three people could determine what is communicated via broadcast television because the only restriction remaining would
be the 35% audience reach limitation. The duopoly restrictions on radio,s6 3 however, preclude
such a scenario.
Unlike the Legislature, however, the Commission continues to endorse the position that controlling local ownership is a prerequisite for diversity. Instead of abandoning the television duopoly
rules in response to the 1996 Act, the FCC is pro202(c)(1)(A) and (B)., 110 Stat. 56 (codified at 47 U.S.C.A.
§ 151 (West Supp. 1996)).
157 See supra notes 77-78 and accompanying text.
158 The 1996 Act, Pub. L. No. 104-104, § 202(b) (1) (D)
110 Stat. 56 (codified at 47 C.F.R. § 7 3.3555(a) (1) (1996)).
159

Id.

See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
The 1996 Act, Pub. L. No. 104-104, § 202(c) (1) (B),
110 Stat. 56 (codified at 47 U.S.C.A. § 151 (West Supp.
1996)).
162 Id. § 202(c) (2).
163 Id. § 202(b).
160
161
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posing to modestly relax the restrictions."' The
FCC is also proactively attempting to reconcile its
own past disparate treatment of the two broadcast
mediums. The Commission is currently considering extending its policy of attributing radio local
marketing agreements ("LMAs") (in calculating
ownership totals) to television LMAs.16 5 If this
regulation is implemented, television owners will
no longer be able to circumvent ownership caps
through the LMA loophole.
B.

The Analytical Framework

1.

The Equal Protection Standard

The initial task for any tribunal determining
whether a law withstands equal protection attack,
is deciding which level of scrutiny to apply. 1 6 6 Regardless of the scrutiny level applied, however, the
critical question in an equal protection challenge
is always "whether there is an appropriate governmental interest suitably furthered by the differential treatment" at issue. 167 There are two variables
in this principal question: (1) what is an "appropriate" governmental interest and (2) what are
the "suitable" means for its achievement. When
the classification is not the result of invidious discrimination 1 6 s and the subject of the regulation is
not a fundamental right,16 9 then "appropriate"
1996 Second FNPRM, see supra note 7. The FCC proposes to modify the current Grade B standard to a rule
prohibiting Grade A station overlap, utilizing Designated
Market Areas (DMA's consist of counties "grouped together
on the basis of actual household viewing patterns" and are
established by the A.C. Nielsen Company), and granting
waivers under certain conditions. Id. n.12 and para. 4. The
Grade A contour is less restrictive because "Grade B contour
encompasses approximately a 50-70 mile radius around the
television station's transmitter while the Grade A encompasses approximately a 30-45 mile radius." Id. n.23. Relying
on DMA vice Grade B contours is thought to be more indicative of a station's true geographic market. Id. para. 14. The
Commission is considering granting waivers to its local television ownership restrictions in order to favor UHF over VHF
and to exempt satellite stations from the rules. The FCC is
also seeking comment on case by case waiver criteria. Id.
para. 30.
164

165

Id.

Rimmer v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 495 F.Supp
1217, 1226 (W.D. .MO 1980). "The first problem for this
Court on this challenge is to determine the level of scrutiny
to which the ... [s] tatute should be subjected"; See Marianne
M.Jennings, A Primerfor the ConstitutionallyImpaired, 32 Duo.
L. REv. 743 (1994) (Summarizing the three levels of scrutiny
used in equal protection jurisprudence as rational basis, intermediate scrutiny, and strict scrutiny). The test applied depends on the subject of the regulation.
166
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becomes "legitimate" and the classification is
"suitable" if it rationally furthers the legitimate
governmental interest. 170 This is known as the rational basis test and is the "least rigorous degree
of scrutiny."17 1 When invidious discrimination or
fundamental rights are involved, however, the
scrutiny level increases and "legitimate" becomes
"compelling" and "rationally furthers" becomes
"necessary."' 72 The result of all this word swapping is the strict scrutiny test. There is also an intermediate level of scrutiny, which falls in between the rational basis and strict scrutiny tests. 173
Perhaps the only thing more daunting than
mastering the above maze of constitutional standards, is determining which level of scrutiny to apply when analyzing whether distinguishing between radio and television in ownership caps is
violative of equal protection. The first step in determining if strict scrutiny is warranted, is deciding if the ownership restrictions implicate the fundamental right to free speech. This requires a
foray into First Amendment jurisprudence.
a. Protection Under the FirstAmendment
The First Amendment prohibits Congress from
making any law which abridges "the freedom of

167
Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95
(1972); Community-Serv. Broad. of Mid-Am., Inc. v. FCC, 593
F.2d 1102, 1122 (D.C.Cir. 1978); Rimmer, 495 F. Supp. at
1217.
168
Invidious means arbitrary, irrational, and not reasonably related to a legitimate purpose. Eaton v. State, 363 A.2d
440, n.2 (1976).
169 Fundamental rights are those rights explicitly or implicitly guaranteed by the Constitution. San Antonio Indep.
Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
170 Mosley, 408 U.S. at 95; Community-Serv. Broad., 593
F.2d at 1122; Rimmer, 495 F. Supp. at 1217.
171
Ameritech Corp. v. United States, 867 F.Supp. 721,
729 (N.D.Ill. 1994).
172 Id.
173 The intermediate, or heightened, level of scrutiny requires the government's differential treatment of individuals
or entities to be "reasonably related" (instead of "rational" or
"necessary") to furthering an "important" (vice "legitimate"
or "compelling") government interest. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973). This intermediate standard is applied when the class is quasi-suspect (See, e.g., Reed v. Reed,
404 U.S. 71 (1971), subjecting gender based classifications to
an intermediate standard) or the right is quasi-fundamental
(See, e.g., Plyer v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982), declaring education to be more than a mere government benefit, and applying heightened scrutiny in striking down a Texas law denying
illegal alien children a free public education).
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speech, or of the press .

."17

Because broadcast-

ers "engage in and transmit speech," they are protected under the "speech" and "press" provisions
of the Amendment.1 7 5 When this protected
speech is encumbered, the courts apply one of
three levels of scrutiny in concluding whether the
burden on speech is justified. These three tests
generally mirror the three scrutiny levels applied
in equal protection analysis.
The First Amendment's rational basis test upholds regulations that are a "reasonable means" of
promoting a "permissible" government interest.176 This test has traditionally been reserved for
regulations burdening broadcasters' freedom of
expression.1 7 7 The rationale for applying the lowest constitutional threshold to broadcast regulations is the scarcity of broadcast spectrum.178 In
upholding the FCC's ban on intra-market common ownership of a newspaper and broadcast station, the Supreme Court reasoned the broadcast
medium possessed unique attributes.179 "In view
of the limited broadcast spectrum, allocation and
regulation of frequencies are essential. Nothing
in the First Amendment prevents such allocation
as will promote the "public interest" in diversification of the mass communications media."180
Deserving of a higher level of protection are
governmental regulations on speech related conduct or on the time, place, and manner of
speech. 81 A regulation survives this intermediate
level of scrutiny if: (1) it is within the constitutional power of the government; (2) it is in furtherance of an important or substantial governmental interest; (3) the governmental interest is
not the suppression of expression; and (4) the
burden on speech is no greater than necessary to
advance the governmental interest.18 2 This test
applies to content-neutral restrictions and
174
175

U.S. Const. amend. I.
Turner Broad. Corp. v. FCC, 114 S.Ct. 2445, 2456

(1994).

FCC v. Nat'l Citizens Comm. for Broad. Sys. Inc., 436
U.S. 775, 796.
177 Red Lion Broad. Co., v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969);
NBC v. United States, 319 U.S. 190 (1943).
178 Id. FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364,
176

377.

Nat'1 Citizens Comm. for Broad., 436 U.S. at 796.
Id. The Court explained that the cross ownership
ban did not violate the First Amendment rights of those denied broadcast licenses because the regulations were a reasonable means to further the public's interest in diversity.
181 Ameritech Corp. v. United States, 867 F.Supp 721,
733 (N.D.Ill. 1994).
179

190
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"[r]equires the government to demonstrate that
its asserted interests are real and that the restriction on speech will further those interests in a 'direct and material way'."18 3 The Supreme Court
has applied this scrutiny level in reviewing, and ultimately upholding, the FCC's requirement that
cable systems carry local broadcast stations.1 8 4
The strictest level of scrutiny in First Amendment jurisprudence is reserved for content based
regulations. These restrictions are upheld only if
they are "necessary to serve a compelling state interest."185
b.

First Amendment Standards and
Ownership Caps

The fact that the three standards are not mutually exclusive is evident when attempting to apply
the framework to broadcast ownership restrictions. The less-than-thorough reader would apply
the rational basis test upon learning that the government has been granted a more intrusive easement into broadcasters' First Amendment rights.
The intermediate scrutiny level, however, is reserved for content neutral restrictions. There is
no guidance on which standard takes precedence
when the regulation in question possesses both attributes, as do the ownership ceilings.
The Judiciary's confusion on the issue is evident
upon an examination of cases involving contentneutral broadcast regulations. In NBC v. United
States, the Court upheld the regulation of the relationship between broadcast stations and networks
in the face of First Amendment challenges. 8 r In
so holding, Justice Frankfurter explained the
broadcast facilities "are not large enough to accommodate all who wish to use them. Methods
must be devised for choosing from among the
182 United States. v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968)
(Four-part test established for regulations on speech related
conduct). Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791
(1989) (three-prong test to be applied to restrictions on the
time, place, and manner of speech). Although Ward's threepart test is slightly different from the O'Brien test, "the
Supreme Court considers the two tests to be roughly the
same." Ameritech, 867 F.Supp at 734.
183
Ameritech, 867 F.Supp at 733.
184 Turner Broad. Corp. v. FCC, 114 S.Ct 2445
(1994).
(The Court found "the appropriate standard by which to
evaluate the constitutionality of must-carry is the intermediate level of scrutiny applicable to content-neutral restrictions
that impose an incidental burden on speech."). Id. at 2469.
185 R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 112 S.Ct 2538 (1992).
186
319 U.S. 190 (1943).
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many who apply."187 In Community-Service Broadcasting v. FCC, however, the court did not adopt
such a deferential standard of review.' 88 The issue for the court was whether it violated the First
Amendment to require non-commercial educational radio and television stations which received
federal funds to record "all broadcasts in which
any issue of public importance [was] discussed."' 9 In concluding that the regulation did
violate the First Amendment, the majority determined the restriction was a content-neutral restraint on First Amendment freedoms and applied the intermediate scrutiny level, even though
the regulated medium was broadcast.190
Despite cases like Community-Service Broadcasting,
the most offered explanation for why ownership
restrictions, and broadcast regulations in general,
do not violate the First Amendment is that the
scarcity of spectrum necessitates regulation to
achieve diversity.19 1 Curiously, the FCC long ago
abandoned the scarcity rationale as warranting
any content based regulations. For example, "an
explosive growth in both the number and types of
[media] outlets in every market . ..."caused the
FCC to eliminate the Fairness Doctrine a decade
ago. 19 2 In passing the 1996 Act, Congress echoed
the opinion of the FCC that scarcity is no longer a
concern in today's telecommunication industry.' 93 This is the foundation upon which Congress substantially demolished the ownership restraints.
Also demolished, however, was the armor protecting ownership restrictions from constitutional
attack. If the spectrum is no longer scarce, then
there is no longer ajustification for erecting barriers to enter the broadcast marketplace. It follows
that, if the remaining constitutionally infirm ownId.
593 F.2d 1102 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
189 Id. at 1104.
190
Id. at 1114.
191 FCC v Nat'l Citizens Comm. for Broad., 436 U.S. 775,
779 (1978); FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364,
376 (1984); One justification for FCC imposed barriers to
broadcasting is that the Communications Act regards the
"Commission as a kind of traffic officer, policing the wave
lengths to prevent stations from interfering with each other.
But the Act does not restrict the Commission merely to supervision of the traffic. It puts upon the Commission the
burden of determining the composition of that traffic." NBC
v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 215-16 (1943).
192
In re Complaint of Syracuse Peace Council against
Television Station WTVH Syracuse, New York, Memorandum
Opinion and Order, 2 FCC Rcd. 5043, n.88 (1987).
187

188
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ership ceilings are challenged under the First
Amendment, the government will have to advance a new justification for its legislation. Since
scarcity is the reason relaxed scrutiny was traditionally applied to broadcasting and scarcity no
longer exists, the government's interest will need
to be more than just permissible.
2.

Equal Protection and Ownership
Restrictions

Returning to the constitutional challenge at issue, the disparate treatment between television
and radio could well be subjected to strict scrutiny. As the absence of scarcity increases, ownership restraints become more suspect under the
First Amendment and the involvement of a fundamental right is more apparent.
The next step, then, in answering the critical
question of "whether there is an appropriate governmental interest suitably furthered by the differential treatment,"19 4 is to see if the government's interest is "compelling." The proposed
purpose of the 1996 Act is "to promote competition." 95 As demonstrated earlier, relaxing ownership caps stifle, not promote, competition. "Certainly, a governmental interest, no matter how
substantial in and of itself, cannot serve tojustify a
statutory classification when the interest is not in
fact one which is truly furthered by the statute." 96
Accordingly, whether promoting competition is a
compelling government interest is moot.
The search then begins for an alternative governmental interest in establishing an audience
reach cap for television. First, Congress may have
sought to restrict the pervasiveness of one broadcast voice in order to ensure diversity at a national
19s "The availability of a multitude of video outlets cable, wireless cable, DBS, and the imminent entry of telephone companies offering video dialtone - evidences the fact
that the duopoly rule has outlived its usefulness." 142 CONG.
REc. H 1164 (1996); "The local media marketplace has undergone a breathtaking transformation. This has been characterized not only by a large increase in the number of
broadcast stations (up one-third in the last decade alone),
but more significantly by an onslaught of new multichannel
rivals to traditional broadcasters, such as cable and satellite
systems, and soon, video dialtone networks." 142 CONG. REC.
1163 (1996).
194 See supra note 167 and accompanying text.
195 The 1996 Act, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (codified at 47 U.S.C.A. § 151 (West Supp. 1996)). .
196
Community-Serv. Broad. of Mid-Am. v. FCC, 593 F.2d
1102, 1123 (1978).
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level. Implementing the objectives of the First
Amendment is clearly a compelling interest. Unfortunately, the means are far from narrowly tailored, which is required under the strict scrutiny
test. The restriction is under-inclusive' 9 7 because,
by not placing a parallel limitation on radio, one
broadcast voice can reach all of America. There
are no differences between television and radio to
justify this discriminatory practice. Although the
FCC is guilty of imposing disparate restrictions on
the similar mediums, its actions have bolstered
the proposition that television and radio are very
similar.
The FCC's justification for adopting the one-toa-market rule in 1970 was diversification.1 98 The
same year, the FCC instituted its regulation barring television broadcast stations from owning
cable systems in the same market.199 The FCC did
not proscribe common ownership of daily newspapers and broadcast stations until 1975.200 This
regulatory scheme suggests that the FCC clearly
viewed television and radio to be similar. Radio
was the only non-visual medium to be regulated
with respect to ownership of visual mediums. By
choosing only radio from the media mix and placing it with the audio-visual mediums of broadcast
and cable, the Commission was silently screaming
that radio and television, whether delivered via
broadcast or over cable wires, were similarly situated.
Twenty years later, the Commission is still declaring that television and radio are equals. "Radio has many of the attributes of television ... and
may be substitutable for diversity concerns." 20 1 In
particular, the FCC explains that both mediums

are free, possess public interest obligations, and
act as vital sources of information. 202
Although the Commission does note one difference between the two broadcast mediums, the dissimilarity does not justify the discriminatory regulation. The FCC suggests that the reason more
people rely on television than radio as news
sources is due to the latter's compelling visual dimension. 203 Even if this theory is accurate, it does
not translate into a compelling reason for Congress to prefer the wider distribution of aural
messages. Advancing the persuasiveness of audiovisual messages as a reason to limit their distribution implies that persuasive communications are
somehow detrimental to the public good. Persuasiveness, however, is not inherently dangerous.
More importantly, deciding what does or does not
persuade is personal to the individual and, since
the government cannot get inside the consumers'
mind, attempting to restrict distribution is not a
narrowly tailored means of controlling influential
messages. From this perspective, the audience
reach cap is under-inclusive 204 for there are far
more sources than just television that disburse
persuasive messages.
The only remaining difference between radio
and television is that there are more radio stations. While this mightjustify different numerical
ownership caps in order to achieve equal maximum percentages of control, it does not give the
government a license to decide which messages
should be heard by a greater percentage of the
nation. Clearly the 35% limitation on televised
communications is not equivalent to the 0% limitation on radio.

197
In equal protection jurisprudence, courts often discuss whether the classification at issue is under- or over-inclusive. A classification is under-inclusive if "[a]ll who are included in the class are tainted with the mischief, but there
are others also tainted whom the classification does not include; [that is,] the classification does not include all who are
similarly situated." Joseph Tussman & Jacobus and Broek,
The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CAL. L. REv., 341, 348
(1949). An over-inclusive classification, on the other hand, is
one which "imposes a burden upon a wider range of individuals than are included in the class of those tainted with the
mischief at which the law aims." Id. at 351. The Court's tolerance for under- or over-inclusive classifications fluctuates
with the level of scrutiny applied. In applying the rational
basis test, the Court has upheld under-inclusive classifications
explaining that Legislatures may achieve their goals step by
step. Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483, 488-89
(1955). Similarly, the Court has approved over-inclusive legislation when applying the deferential rationality test. See,
e.g., City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297 (1976) (up-

holding an over-inclusive classification because .rational distinctions may be made with substantially less than mathematical exactitude"). In strict scrutiny analysis, however, the
Court will invalidate laws based on under- or over-inclusive
classifications. See, e.g., Rimmer v. Colt Indus. Operating
Corp., 495 F.Supp. 1217, 1228 (W.D.Mo. 1980) (applying
strict scrutiny and striking down Missouri law as violative of
the Constitution's equal protection clause because it was
both under- and over-inclusive).
198 1970 First Report and Order, supra note 47, at 311.
199 In re Amendment of Rules Relative to CATV, Second
Report and Order, 23 F.C.C. 816 (1970).
200 In re Amendment of Rules Relating to Multiple Ownership of Std., FM, and TV Stations, Second Report and Order,
50 F.C.C.2d 1046 (1975).
201
1995 FNPRM, supra note 4, para. 68.
202
203

Id.
Id.

204

See supra note 197.
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Even if, in the absence of scarcity, the ownership restrictions could withstand a First Amendment challenge, thus lowering the equal protection scrutiny to a rational basis test, the disparate
treatment could not stand. There is nothing rational about an under-inclusive law or one that
distinguishes between two mediums that are
equally capable of promoting or destroying diversity.
V. CONCLUSION
In passing the 1996 Act, one legislative skeptic
stated, "I hope we don't discover later that we've
lost sight of the public in this process and of the
need to protect the public from potential monopoly abuse." 205 The general relaxation of ownership restrictions, which has resulted in concentrated control of broadcast facilities, makes this
concern a reality. Further, the idea of broadcasting in the public interest, through local and diverse programming, is overshadowed by the ab205

142
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sentee group owners' interests in building media
empires. Senator Pressler boasted that his bill
would cause an "explosion in new investment and
development," and the consumers to be the winners.206 Unfortunately, Mr. Pressler's predicted
explosion did occur, however, the fallout, not the
benefit, is on the consumers.
Besides loosing sight of the public interest in
enacting the 1996 Act, Congress violated the very
document that gave it life. Although ownership
caps have been upheld under the First Amendment, based on a now questionable scarcity rationale, it does not follow that this past approval
clothes them in armor sufficient to withstand constitutional attacks of a different nature. The disparate treatment between radio and television results in the government favoring purely aural
messages over their audio-visual counterparts.
The distinction is void of any principled rationale,
and fails to survive an equal protection challenge
under even the most deferential scrutiny.
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